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A Case for the Right 
to Self-Determination 
in Africa’s Last Colony
by Ryan Allman
STUDENT COLUMNS
For over 40 years, the Saharawi people of Western 
Sahara have lived divided by a 1,700-mile sand wall.[1] 
The wall, or “berm,” built in the 1980s by the King-
dom of Morocco, is the longest defensive fortification 
in use today, littered with landmines and barbed wire 
and manned by tens of thousands of Moroccan troops.
[2] Dividing the occupied and liberated territories 
of Western Sahara, the berm is a physical manifes-
tation of Morocco’s unlawful denial of the Saharawi 
people’s right to self-determination that has resulted 
in a four-decade long abuse of the Saharawi people’s 
human rights, including the rights to be free from tor-
ture, to freedom of expression, and to peaceful assem-
bly and association. To address this abuse of human 
rights, the UN must facilitate a referendum for the 
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.
In 1975, Morocco annexed Western Sahara, a former 
Spanish colony.[3] Since then, the Saharawi peo-
ple have lived in the occupied territory or as refu-
gees in exile.[4] The latest report from the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 
170,000 Saharawi currently live in the Tindouf refu-
gee camps in southwest Algeria.[5] In 1991, a United 
Nations-brokered ceasefire established the United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sa-
hara (MINURSO),[6] which ended the war between 
Morocco and the Saharawi liberation movement, the 
Polisario Front, and left Western Sahara a UN des-
ignated “Non-Self-Governing Territory.”[7] Almost 
thirty years later, the Saharawi people still await the 
referendum that would allow the people of Western 
Sahara to freely determine their political future.[8] 
Despite an opinion from the International Court of 
Justice in 1975 that Morocco has no valid claim to the 
territory of Western Sahara,[9] Morocco continues to 
unlawfully occupy the region and deny the Saharawi 
people a referendum.[10]
The right to self-determination is the legal right of 
people to decide their own political future. A core 
principle of international law,[11] self-determina-
tion is enshrined in customary international law[12] 
and international treaties.[13] Under international 
law, minority or oppressed groups have the right to 
self-determination, which protects the ability to freely 
determine their political fate and form a representative 
government.[14] The principle of self-determination 
originated to justify people’s pursuit for independence 
from colonial governments that did not adequately 
represent their interests.[15]
Morocco, as the occupying power of the Western 
Sahara, and as State Party to the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[16] the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights (ICESCR),[17] and as a UN Member State, is 
obligated under international law, to allow the Sahara-
wi people to realize their right to self-determination.
[18] Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR enshrine the 
right to self-determination for a Non-Self-Governing 
people to “freely determine their political status.”[19] 
The UN Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, in its 2015 ICESCR review of Morocco, stated 
its “concern about the failure to find a solution to the 
right to self-determination of the Non-Self- Governing 
Territory of Western Sahara.”[20] Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter requires UN Member States to respect 
territorial integrity,[21] and Article 73 enshrines the 
right to self-determination.[22]
The non-realization of the Saharawi people’s right to 
self-determination has prevented their enjoyment of 
other human rights, including the right to be free from 
torture. Human rights defenders and human rights 
monitoring groups report a history of disappearanc-
es, torture, intimidations, arrests, detainments, abuse 
in captivity, grotesque sentences, and denial of fair 
trials in the occupied Western Sahara.[23] Morocco is 
required to observe the Saharawi right to be free from 
torture as a State Party to the UN Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (the Convention against 
Torture)[24] and under the UN Charter.[25] Torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment is prohibited by Article 7 of the ICCPR and the 
Convention against Torture.[26]
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have “disappeared,” after being arrested by Moroccan 
security forces.[35] Today, hundreds of disappeared 
persons remain unaccounted for, and the Moroccan 
government denies knowledge of the disappearances.
[36] In 2016, the UN Committee Against Torture re-
ported that Morocco breached UN Convention against 
Torture Articles 1 and 12 to 16,[37] with regard to the 
treatment of Saharawi activist Naâma Asfari, finding 
that Moroccan authorities failed to investigate Asfari’s 
allegations of torture and other ill-treatment, protect 
him and his lawyers from reprisals, and denied him 
reparations including medical rehabilitation and com-
pensation.[38]
Morocco is required to also observe the Saharawi right 
to freedom of assembly. In particular, Articles 21 and 
22 of the ICCPR[39] and Article 8 of the ICESCR en-
shrine the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.[40] Moreover, Moroccan authorities sys-
tematically restrict freedom of expression, association 
and peaceful assembly in Western Sahara, preventing 
gatherings supporting Saharawi self-determination, 
obstructing the work of local human rights NGOs,[41] 
and threatening and abusing activists and journalists.
[42] Human Rights Watch reported that, in June 2018, 
Moroccan police beat up at least seven activists who 
organized a pro-independence protest.[43] According 
to Amnesty International, human rights defenders are 
intensely surveilled, sometimes amounting to harass-
ment.[44] U.S. journalists reporting for Democracy 
Now! recently documented heavy surveillance by 
Moroccan authorities when visiting the occupied ter-
ritories in 2016.[45] These actions are in conflict with 
Morocco’s responsibility as a State Party to the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR to protect the Saharawi people’s free-
dom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.
Furthermore, human rights abuses in the region go 
largely under-reported. MINURSO remains the only 
modern UN peacekeeping mission established since 
1978 without a mandate to monitor human rights.[46] 
This lack of a human rights mandate leaves the conflict 
region without an independent and impartial mecha-
nism to monitor human rights abuses in both Western 
Sahara and the Tindouf camps. Moroccan authorities 
claim that the Moroccan National Council of Human 
Rights (CNDH) protects human rights in the territo-
ry.[47] However, the King of Morocco appoints the 
president and at least nine of CNDH’s twenty-seven 
members.[48]
In 1993, Morocco ratified the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, requiring the country to 
abolish and prevent torture or other forms of ill-treat-
ment from undermining the right to a fair trial.[27] 
Morocco’s constitution also forbids torture, and the 
country’s penal code criminalizes torture.[28] Yet, 
despite laws to the contrary, Moroccan courts had a 
long-standing record of using torture and coercion to 
secure evidence to convict civilian prisoners.[29] Until 
reforms were made in 2015 to end military trials for 
civilians, Morocco regularly tried civilians in military 
courts[30] and continues to arbitrarily detain civilians 
based on military court sentences, as in the case of 
Mbarek Daoudi, a Saharawi activist held since Septem-
ber 2013.[31] A Moroccan military court sentenced 
twenty-five Saharawi to prison in 2013, based on con-
fessions allegedly obtained by means of torture.[32] 
These charges were made in connection to the violent 
resistance against Moroccan security forces who dis-
mantled the Gdeim Izik protest camps in 2010.[33] In 
response to protest from human rights organizations, 
these prisoners were granted a re-trail in a civilian 




Human Rights Brief, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol23/iss1/1
The violations of human rights in Western Sahara are 
a consequence of the Moroccan denial of the Sahara-
wi people’s right to self-determination.[49] For the 
Saharawi people to realize their human rights, the UN 
must facilitate a referendum. Until the people of the 
Western Sahara determine their political future, the 
UN must facilitate international monitoring and ob-
servance of human rights in both Western Sahara and 
the refugee camps to ensure human rights violations 
do not occur.
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In February 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Ore-
gon sentenced Daniel Stephen Johnson to a lifetime 
in prison for repeatedly sexually abusing children in 
an unlicensed orphanage that he operated under the 
guise of a missionary in Cambodia.[1] This case is one 
of many, and exemplifies the pressing need for the im-
plementation of comprehensive protective policies to 
safeguard children living in Cambodian orphanages.
The link between child abuse in Cambodian orphan-
ages and tourism is a complex issue stemming from 
Cambodia’s recent history of war and genocide. In 
1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) and many foreign NGOs en-
tered the country in an effort to aid in Cambodia’s 
reconstruction.[2] In the process, UNTAC and NGOs 
expanded the market for Western tourism, as well as 
highlighted the vulnerabilities of Cambodian people 
during the post-genocide era.[3] However, as tourists 
began flocking to Cambodia’s historical memorials and 
ancient temples, the country also drew two other types 
of tourists — those looking to volunteer, and those 
looking to engage in sex tourism.[4] More specifical-
ly, “orphanage tourism” became a tourist commodity 
in Cambodia.[5] While orphanage tourism and sex 
tourism are different, the prevalence of sex tourism 
in Cambodia and orphanage tourism has significant 
overlap.[6] Rising tourism rates coincided with in-
creasing amounts of children living in residential care 
institutions, commonly known as orphanages.[7] 
Children in these facilities are particularly vulnerable 
to abuse and exploitation.[8]
According to UNICEF estimates, the number of or-
phans decreased substantially between 2009 and 2014.
[9] Despite there being fewer orphans, the number 
of orphanages and children living in orphanages has 
doubled.[10] In 2005, there were approximately 150 
orphanages, and in 2019, there were over 400.[11] 
Additionally, an inspection by the Cambodian govern-
ment revealed that out of the 16,000 Cambodian chil-
dren housed in orphanages, 68 percent have at least 
one living parent.[12] The problem became so great 
that UNICEF began referring to so-called orphanages 
as residential living institutions.[13] Many low income 
families are persuaded by institution directors to place 
their children in residential care facilities, thinking 
that their children will have better lives there, with 
access to food, education, and medical care.[14] But, 
the reality is that many children in residential care in-
stitutions are subjected to abuse and neglect.[15] Some 
institutions force children to make handicrafts or force 
them to perform dances for visiting tourists — mak-
ing these institutions the means of a type of modern 
slavery.[16] Thus, the demand for this type of tourism 
led to an increased number of children in residential 
care institutions who are significantly more likely to be 
exposed to physical and sexual abuse, as well as delib-
erate under-nourishment to solicit more donations.
[17]
Cambodia has ratified the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.[18] Article 20 states that children 
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to special protection and assistance provided by the 
State.”[19] Additionally, Articles 34 and 39 protect 
children from physical and sexual abuse and mandate 
special assistance if exposed to violence.[20] Fur-
thermore, in the 2015 Méndez Report, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Juan E. Méndez, illuminated 
the need to recognize orphanages and residential care 
facilitates as detention centers under international law.
[21] In this report, a State party to the UN Convention 
against Torture (CAT) must ensure specific standards 
to protect people from torture.[22] As a ratified mem-
ber of the CAT, Cambodia has duties under Article 11, 
which requires that detention centers are kept under 
systematic review by the State. The Mendez Report 
elaborates that states have an obligation to “prevent 
torture or other ill-treatment of children, together 
with their rights to liberty and family life, through 
legislation, policies, and practices that allow children 
to remain with family members or guardians in a 
non-custodial, community-based context.”[23]
As a party to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the Cambodian government has made signifi-
cant efforts to comply with the treaty, and it has imple-
mented an Action Plan for Improving Child Care.[24] 
In 2015, the government initiated the Sub-Decree on 
the Management of Residential Care Centers, which 
attempts to map and ultimately regulate the residential 
care institutions across the country.[25] Additionally, 
they have introduced a reintegration program work-
ing with NGOs, such as the Cambodian Child’s Trust, 
to provide resources to families who are reintegrat-
ing children back into their homes.[26] Since 2015, 
Cambodia has reduced the number of residential care 
institutions by 35 percent, and the number of children 
living in these institutions has decreased by 54 percent.
[27] While these numbers are promising, the contin-
ued allowance of orphanage tourism and the overall 
lack of comprehensive legislation fails to adequately 
protect children in Cambodia.[28] Likewise, Cambo-
dia has failed to provide a network of social workers to 
aid in rehabilitation efforts for children who have been 
abused while living in these institutions.[29] Attempt-
ing to draw attention to its own citizens’ role in per-
petuating the social issue in Cambodia, Australia is the 
first country to implement legislation identifying the 
practice of short-term volunteering in orphanages as a 
form of modern slavery.[30] While this recognition of 
the issue may impact internal guilt that foreign citi-
zens have in the harming of Cambodian children, the 
policy has yet to stop other countries from allowing its 
citizens to partake in volunteer tourism.[31]
The link between child abuse in Cambodian orphan-
ages and tourism is often overlooked by the good 
intentions of those volunteering. However, the nature 
of Cambodia’s tourism, paired with lacking legislative 
components to protect children in residential care 
institutions is a violation of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child — specifically  specifically a 
child’s right to a family and the right to integrate into 
the community.[32] It also violates obligations under 
the UN Convention against Torture, under Article 
11.[33] The efforts of the Cambodian government to 
prevent the institutionalization of children as a result 
of tourism is increasing; however, it still needs to im-
plement policies that prevent unlicensed orphanages 
and untrained volunteers from working with children 
to be compliant with its international legal obligations 
under these two conventions. Finally, the role that for-
eign governments play in their citizens perpetuating 
the institutionalization of children in Cambodia must 
be recognized on a global scale.
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Indonesian Government Pro-
poses Legislation Attacking 
Anti-Corruption Agency, 
Brutally Cracks Down on 
Student Protesters
by Hailey Ferguson
Anti-corruption protests have been a growing trend 
around the world as citizens increasingly are rising up 
to oppose government activity that has led to system-
ic and endemic corruption. In the past two months, 
Indonesian students have led peaceful protests op-
PHOTO OF CAMBODIAN CHILDREN OUTSIDE THE 
KHMER LITERACY SCHOOL VIA WIKIMEDIA COMMONS 




Human Rights Brief, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol23/iss1/1
posing such human rights abuses. The protesters’ 
grievances are directed toward President Joko Widodo 
and his government, stemming primarily from the 
government’s support of legislation recently passed in 
Parliament that would curb the power of the nation’s 
anti-corruption apparatus.[1]
The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was 
formed in 2002 with the primary goal of internally 
prosecuting corrupt government actors in Jakarta, but 
it is now in danger of being prevented from carrying 
out that purpose by the current government.[2] Indo-
nesia has been plagued with corruption throughout 
the Widodo administration.[3] Independent corrup-
tion reports suggest rampant bribery within the public 
service sector and a judicial system that is independent 
in name but is largely influenced by political interests.
[4] It is not just the KPK that is in trouble; the Widodo 
administration is both scrutinizing those within the 
government less and attacking personal and econom-
ic freedoms more by revising the Criminal Code.[5] 
Students and young people throughout the country 
have grown energized and have been demonstrating 
against these extreme legislative changes over the past 
few months. As of September 2019, Jakarta police have 
injured over 300 protesters, killing one.[6]
As a member of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, Indonesia is under an obligation to uphold 
the “promotion and protection of civil rights around 
the globe,” and within its own borders.[7] Admittedly, 
a seat on the Human Rights Council does not neces-
sarily guarantee that a state upholds human rights ob-
ligations, as several of the states on the Human Rights 
Council have extensive records of human rights viola-
tions. However, recently Indonesia has recently taken 
action to permit itself to be held accountable for hu-
man rights violations. In 2006, Indonesia ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), agreeing to undertake specific responsi-
bilities to uphold civil and political freedoms under 
Article 2.[8] Additionally, the right to peaceful assem-
bly is protected under Article 21 of the ICCPR and 
Article 20 of the UDHR.[9] In essence, Indonesia has 
agreed that all people whose rights have been violated 
will have access to a fair remedy issued by “competent 
judicial, administrative, or legislative authorities,” even 
if the violator of rights comes from within the state 
itself.[10] By crippling the internal accountability and 
anti-corruption organs within its own government, the 
current Indonesian administration is directly skirting 
those duties. Not only will there be no free and inde-
pendent judiciary to deal with internal corruption, 
but any subsequent changes in the laws would likely 
infringe on the rights of Indonesian citizens.
In a sharp diversion from what many hoped would 
be a period of progressive reforms under Widodo, 
his administration has used the legislature in order to 
bolster its own powers.[11] The executive is effectively 
supporting abuses being carried out by the security 
forces against peaceful protesters, ultimately quashing 
the Indonesian people’s freedom of expression.[12] 
Even after Human Rights Watch issued formal con-
cerns to Widodo in writing, international or internal 
pressure will not force the government to abide by the 
agreements that Indonesia has signed.[13]
The extreme use of force against peaceful demonstra-
tors in Jakarta and other major cities in Indonesia is 
particularly disturbing. After the hundreds of casual-
ties in these protests and those in the August Papua 
protests, the Indonesian government has experienced 
increased scrutiny by human rights groups as of late.
PROTESTERS IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 24TH 
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[14] There are videos and images circulating on social 
media showing the police using excessive force on the 
protesters, mostly young university students.[15] A 
representative from Amnesty International in Indo-
nesia notes that the security forces’ actions are “not in 
accordance with standard [security] procedure,” and 
it is written into law that the police force “must follow 
human rights principles while on the job.”[16] Not 
only this, but this disturbing activity by the security 
force is endangering the Indonesian citizens’ right to 
peaceful assembly clearly protected by the ICCPR and 
the UDHR.[17]
Human rights abuses perpetrated by state security 
forces against peaceful student protests in Jakarta con-
tinue a concerning trend of violent responses by police 
that result in civilian casualties.[18] Last year saw mass 
protests from citizens in Chile, Lebanon, Hong Kong, 
and more, demanding a change in leadership when 
they felt the so-called democratic systems in place 
had failed. Some of these protests, such as in Beirut, 
were also a referendum on the central governments as 
we saw in Jakarta, but all had a similar response from 
state police causing widespread injury or death.[19] 
There is evidence of security forces in other absolutist 
states systemically using torture and sexual violence 
against detainees arrested at peaceful protests in order 
to quell rising populism.[20] Additionally, many police 
are simply not trained to handle the large scale public 
movements that are increasingly common globally. 
Tactics such as using live ammunition to clear protest-
ers will only cause more casualties to those asserting 
the rights afforded to them and contest government’s 
claims that their security forces are there to protect 
citizens. Unfortunately, since these incidents are so 
widespread amongst countries that are experiencing 
populist movements similar to Indonesia, it is unlikely 
to see an international referendum on security force 
human rights abuses promptly.
With the lack of pressure against other states suffering 
from similar protester abuse and government corrup-
tion issues, there is little hope that other states simply 
condemning such issues will be effective. However, 
often governments are forced to make changes when 
faced with economic pressure from partners in the 
market. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) established the ASEAN Economic Commu-
nity (AEC) in the early 2000s, which plans to connect 
individual Southeast Asian markets to increase equi-
table development, and eventually integrate the region 
into the larger global marketplace.[21] This organiza-
tion has already taken great strides, and only stands to 
become more lucrative as the region develops further. 
If ASEAN utilizes sanctions or regional trade freezes 
to block Indonesia from lucrative economic opportu-
nities with the AEC, the Widodo government would 
be forced to make reforms to the administrative ac-
tions that have placed public freedoms at risk. Region-
al organizations with meaningful influence, economic 
or otherwise, are responsible for pressuring Widodo 
to uphold the laws that Indonesia is a signatory to in 
order to halt any further actions that would unduly 
strengthen the government at the expense of Indone-
sian citizens’ freedom.
1 Reuters News Agency, Indonesia puts anti-corruption agency 
under supervisory board, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 17, 2019), https://
www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/indonesia-puts-anti-corrup-
tion-agency-supervisory-board-190917084614211.html.
2 Anti-Corruption Authorities, Profiles: Indonesia, THE WORLD 
BANK GROUP (2020), https://www.acauthori-ties.org/country/
id.
3 Scott Edwards, Indonesia’s struggle to end corruption is hitting 
snag after snag, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/indone-
sia-corruption.aspx.
4 Bus. Anti-Corruption Portal, Indon. Corruption Report, (2020), 
https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-pro-files/indone-
sia/.
5 Id; Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: Draft Criminal Code 
Disastrous for Rights, (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2019/09/18/indonesia-draft-criminal-code-disas-
trous-rights#.
6 Febriana Firdaus, What’s driving the latest protests in 
Indonesia, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.al-
jazeera.com/news/2019/09/driving-latest-protests-indone-
sia-190926090413270.html.
7 United Nations Human Rights Council, https://www.ohchr.org/
en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/home.aspx.
8 Chrisbiantoro, Indon.: A Review of the Indon. Gov’t’s Obli-
gation under Int’l Human Rights Instruments…, Asian Human 
Rights Commission (May 30, 2019), http://www.humanrights.
asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-PAP-001-2019/; G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 
1966).
9 G.A. Res 2200A (XXA), supra note 8; G.A. Res. 217A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948).
10 Chrisbiantoro, supra note 8.
11 Editorial, The Guardian view on Indonesia’s president: after the 
hope, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2019/nov/03/the-guardian-view-on-indone-
sias-president-after-the-hope#maincontent.
12 Where did the reformist just re-elected as Indonesia’s president 





Human Rights Brief, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol23/iss1/1
indonesias-president-go.
13 Brad Adams, Letter to President Joko Widodo, Human Rights 
Watch (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/sup-
porting_resources/190807_indonesia_jokowi_second_term.pdf.
14 Febriana Firdaus, At least 20 dead in protests in Indonesia’s 
West Papua, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2019/09/deaths-reported-fresh-protests-indone-
sia-west-papua-190923071714912.html.
15 Elisabeth Glory Victory, Reports of Police Brutality Spike in 





17 G.A. Res 2200A (XXA), supra note 8; G.A. Res. 217A, supra 
note 9.
18 Shailja Sharma, When global populism and violence collide, 
TRTWORLD (Mar 6, 2020), https://www.trt-world.com/opinion/
when-global-populism-and-violence-collide-34345.
19 Lebanon: Little Action on Corruption Economic Crisis, HU-
MAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/01/14/lebanon-little-action-corruption-economic-cri-
sis.
20 U.N., UN human rights report cites ‘multiple root causes’ of 
deadly Chile protests, UN NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://news.
un.org/en/story/2019/12/1053491.
21 ASEAN Economic Community, About AEC, http://investase-
an.asean.org/index.php/page/view/asean-economic-community/
view/670/newsid/755/about-aec.html.
of Morocco’s systematic violations of sexual and repro-
ductive rights.[6]
Morocco criminalizes abortion except when a preg-
nancy is life-threatening to the mother.[7] Pregnan-
cies resulting from rape and incest must be carried to 
term according to the law.[8] Additionally, sex before 
marriage is expressly prohibited: thousands of people 
were tried for premarital sex in 2018.[9] These prohibi-
tions are codified in Articles 454 and 490, respectively, 
of Morocco’s penal code.[10] Shortly after Raissouni’s 
arrest, hundreds of women signed a manifesto pro-
claiming their participation in illicit premarital sex 
and abortion; they also took to the streets in solidarity 
with Raissouni and in protest of the anti-premarital sex 
laws.[11]
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which Moroc-
co ratified in 1979, guarantees the right to physical 
and mental health.[12] The United Nation’s Economic 
and Social Council clarified the full scope of Article 
12 in Agenda item three of its meeting in the Spring 
of 2000: it “may be understood as requiring measures 
to improve…sexual and reproductive health services, 
including access to family planning, pre- and post-na-
tal care, emergency obstetric services and access to 
information, as well as to resources necessary to act on 
that information.”[13] A country that surveils medical 
offices to ensure they are not providing abortions is ac-
tively inhibiting access to reproductive health services.
[14] The law forces hundreds of women to seek dan-
gerous “back-alley” abortions every day.[15] Not only 
is Morocco in violation of the ICESCR, but it is leaving 
women with only hazardous options for terminating 
pregnancies.
Morocco’s laws on premarital sex and abortion also 
contravene the premise of the Convention to End All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
of which Morocco is a State Party.[16] Part I Article 
I of CEDAW asserts that “marital status” cannot be a 
vehicle for discrimination.[17] Regulating sex solely 
amongst those who are unmarried is therefore a pro-
hibited practice. Furthermore, Article 12 states: “state 
parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health 
care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, access to health care services, including 
those related to family planning.”[18] Equality between 
In Morocco, Her Body is Not 
Her Choice
by Arielle Kafker
Hajar Raissouni is a writer for Akhbar Al Yaoum, an 
independent Moroccan newspaper. The twenty-eight-
year-old was arrested on August 31, 2019 on charges 
of engaging in premarital sex and having an abortion.
[1] She was apprehended outside her gynecologist’s 
office alongside her fiancé, doctor, nurse, and a med-
ical secretary, all of whom faced ancillary charges.[2] 
Raissouni claimed she was visiting her gynecologist 
because of a blood clot.[3] On September 30, 2019, a 
court convicted Raissouni and sentenced her to one 
year in prison for violating statutes on extramarital sex 
and prohibited abortion.[4] Officials interrogated Rais-
souni during her pre-trial detention and forced her to 
submit to a medical examination because of the alleged 
abortion.[5] Details of her private life were also shared 
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the sexes cannot exist in healthcare when men have 
complete agency over their medical care and women 
do not. Morocco must better integrate family planning 
and women’s healthcare generally as protected rights. 
Monitoring doctors’ offices restricts forms of care 
women seek: when a woman is put in jail because she 
sought treatment for a blood clot, all women become 
too afraid to seek medical care for any reason. Though 
Morocco’s policy does not directly inhibit women’s 
access to medical services unrelated to abortion, it is 
the inevitable consequence of surveilling gynecological 
offices and penalizing women they suspect of engaging 
in premarital sex or abortion. To combat the dimin-
ishing of women’s health—as Morocco is obligated to 
do under CEDAW—it must enact policies, stopping its 
surveillance of medical offices and its punishment of 
women exercising their bodily autonomy.
Morocco is also in violation of international law for 
its treatment of Hajar Raissouni. Parties to the Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which 
Morocco ratified in 1993, are obliged to stop torture 
within their borders.[19] According to the CAT, tor-
ture is defined as a public official inflicting, or consent-
ing to, severe pain or suffering.[20] When Raissouni 
was taken into custody, she was brought to a hospital 
for a forced gynecological exam.[21] A procedure as 
invasive as a gynecological exam would likely result 
in both physical and emotional pain and suffering 
when done without consent.[22] This examination was 
intentionally executed at the bequest of the Moroccan 
government because it occurred while Raissouni was 
in the custody of the State.[23] The alleged purpose of 
the exam was to gain information: to discover whether 
an illegal abortion had occurred, which is inherently 
discriminatory because it stems from legislation dis-
criminating on the basis of sex.[24]
Once the exam was complete, Raissouni was returned 
to detention, where she was questioned about her sex-
ual and reproductive behaviors.[25] The information 
gathered by law enforcement was disseminated to the 
public.[26] Both are invasions of privacy that contra-
venes Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, which guarantees a right to privacy.[27] 
The Article espouses a general right to privacy, and 
specifically, that a person’s reputation is protected.[28] 
In publicizing such socially taboo allegations, Rais-
souni’s reputation was harmed.[29] Additionally, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which Morocco ratified in 1979, protects the 
right to privacy inclusive of reputation.[30] The IC-
CPR allows exceptions only when the interference is as 
unintrusive as possible and when there is a legitimate 
necessity; neither circumstance was met in this case.
[31] Morocco has historically illegally interfered with 
the protected right to privacy of journalists through 
surveillance.[32]
On October 16, 2019, King Mohammed VI issued a 
pardon to Raissouni, and she was released from jail.
[33] The state should be held accountable in terms of 
reparations for Raissouni, as well as for enacting policy 
ending the discrimination in women’s healthcare pro-
vision.
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Combatting Femicide in 
France
by Adrian Lewis
“Femicide” is defined in France as the death of a 
woman at the hands of her partner or ex-partner.[1] 
More than 130 women were killed by their partners in 
2019, exceeding the government’s count of 121 vic-
tims of femicide the previous year.[2] Though not the 
highest among western European countries, France’s 
rate of femicide is higher than that of many neighbor-
ing countries, including Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and the UK.[3] A steady increase of domestic violence 
deaths in recent years has sparked outrage and calls for 
legislative change to combat the growing trend.[4] As a 
State Party to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
France’s failure to adequately address violence against 
women is a violation of its obligations under Article 12 
of the Convention, as elaborated in CEDAW General 
Recommendation 19, which requires states to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure women have equal 
access to healthcare and related services, including 
those that protect against a known or suspected threat 
of physical violence.[5]
Illustrative of the worsening trend was the September 
2019 murder of a 27-year old mother of three from 
northern France.[6] She was in the process of sepa-
rating from her 37-year old husband when, following 
an apparent dispute, he stabbed her fourteen times as 
their three young children looked on. Law enforce-
ment had been called to the woman’s home only the 
previous week, after she reported to police that her 
husband was threatening her with a knife. A common 
thread running through so many tragic accounts of 
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in the days and weeks preceding their murders. Such 
pleas repeatedly elicited responses from law enforce-
ment officers claiming there was not enough evidence 
to detain a violent abuser or to confiscate a partner’s 
weapon.[7] The experiences of numerous victims of 
femicide have been shared in the press, often made 
public by family members only after the women’s worst 
fears were realized.[8] Such stories recount women’s 
harrowing struggles to seek help from police and to 
secure protection for themselves and their children. 
Increasingly, such delays are costing women their lives.
[9] And with each death, calls for government action 
and legislative change have grown louder.[10]
In September, France’s secretary for gender equality 
called civil society representatives together with actors 
from government, politics, and the healthcare sector to 
participate in a three-month consultation on how best 
to confront the challenge.[11] Results of the multi-sec-
tor initiative included plans for the widespread imple-
mentation of electronic bracelets to monitor the loca-
tion of offenders in relation to their victims and the 
suspension of child visitation rights for offenders al-
ready separated from their former partners.[12] While 
the conference served to increase public awareness of 
the issue, activists note that no additional funding was 
earmarked to combat violence against women, which 
was one of civil society’s primary demands of govern-
ment in undertaking the three-month conference.[13]
Several international legal instruments exist for the 
protection of women who are vulnerable to the kind 
of domestic violence that too often ends in femicide.
[14] Most notably, the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) obligates member states to take positive 
measures to eliminate all forms of violence against 
women, including domestic violence.[15] Such mea-
sures are outlined in Article 2, which stipulates that 
signatory states “agree to establish legal protection of 
the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to 
ensure through competent national tribunals and other 
public institutions the effective protection of women 
against any act of discrimination.”[16] Growing rates 
of femicide suggest France must take additional action 
to establish its commitment to CEDAW. The conven-
tion’s 16 articles aim to end discrimination at the root 
of violent crimes against women and demand active 
measures on the part of member states to advance this 
objective.[17]
In addition, France recently strengthened its commit-
ment by adopting the Optional Protocol to CEDAW 
aimed at more effectively monitoring member states’ 
compliance with the Convention.[18] On a more 
fundamental level, France is a party to key treaties and 
conventions that form the foundation of the modern 
international human rights framework, including the 
International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social & Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Conven-
tion Against Torture.[19] Legal analysis based on the 
principles in the Convention Against Torture has illus-
trated how acts of domestic violence can be interpreted 
as acts of torture.[20]
The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront 
of efforts to enshrine into law the equal rights of 
women by prioritizing them in the Strategic Engage-
ment for Gender Equality 2016-2019 framework.
[21] The Council of Europe, the EU’s human rights 
body, took the latest step toward realizing an end to 
violence against women in 2011 with the ratification 
of the Istanbul Convention, the formal title of which 
is the “Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic 
violence.”[22] Its primary objectives are embodied 
in Article 3(a) of the convention; “violence against 
women” is understood as a violation of human rights 
and a form of discrimination against women and shall 
mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, 
or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological 
or economic harm or suffering to women, including 
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
[23]
France’s obligation to end violence against women 
within its borders is thus enshrined in both regional 
legislation like the Istanbul Convention, as well as in 
international agreements like CEDAW and those listed 
above.[24] In fulfilling its relevant obligations, France 
should follow the example of neighboring countries 
and invest additional resources into ensuring local law 
enforcement agencies are equipped with the training 
and resources to effectively aid women who report 
domestic violence.[25] In Spain, the government has 
established a separate system comprised of 100 spe-
cialized courts that hear only cases of sexual violence 
against women.[26] This additional measure has 
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one third.
In addition to providing legal remedies, Article 20 of 
the Istanbul Convention states that the provision of 
shelter and physical protection from immediate threats 
must always be available to victims seeking assistance 
and redress.[27] Under Article 15, France is obliged to 
take active steps to provide or strengthen appropriate 
training for professionals interacting with victims and 
to introduce training on coordinated multi-agency 
cooperation to enable comprehensive handling of cases 
involving violence against women.[28]
France’s progress toward ending femicide within its 
borders is dependent on the implementation of the 
policies outlined above, as well as those detailed in 
the regional and international human rights conven-
tions that have been ratified by its legislature. France’s 
government and law enforcement agencies are afforded 
sufficient means within the text of such agreements 
to end femicide in France.[29] All that remains is a 
national commitment to operationalizing the legal 
instruments at their disposal to protect women from 
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of the Indian Constitution for over fifty years.[6] This 
status was also protected by UN Security Council Res-
olution 47 in 1948.[7] Since 1989, various groups have 
protested for Kashmir’s right to self-determination, 
leading to a rise in violence and approximately 77,000 
killed in the region over the past thirty years.[8]
On August 5, 2019, the Indian Prime Minister, Naren-
dra Modi, controversially decided to remove Kashmir’s 
autonomous status under Article 370.[9] Subsequently, 
India shut down access to internet and mobile com-
munication in the region.[10] Adding further tension, 
on August 6, 2019, the President of India, Ram Nath 
Kovind, ordered that Jammu and Kashmir be reor-
ganized into two separate union territories.[11] This 
designation eliminates representation in the federal 
government and gives the central government of India 
direct control over the region.[12]
During the lockdown, roughly 3,800 Kashmiris were 
detained without charge or trial.[13] According to 
the Indian government, as of September 6, 2019, over 
1,000 remain in prison.[14]
However, most journalists have been barred from 
entering the region to verify data.[15] Many of those 
arrested have been beaten or tortured by security forc-
es.[16] Some detained Kashmiris have been transport-
ed to prisons more than 1,000 kilometers away from 
Kashmir.[17] The government has not disclosed the 
reasons for these detentions. Those arrested include 
local politicians, journalists, lawyers, or suspected 
political dissidents, including the former chief minis-
ter of Kashmir.[18] However, the government has not 
provided reasons for the detention of other civilians 
without political influence, including children.[19]
International human rights standards do not allow for 
prolonged, arbitrary detention. Article 9 of the ICCPR, 
which India has ratified, states that no one shall be 
arbitrarily arrested or detained without trial.[20] The 
Indian security forces are obligated to inform detained 
individuals of the reason for their arrest and to allow 
them access to a trial in a timely manner. If the deten-
tion appears to be unlawful, detainees are entitled to 
take proceedings to court and be fairly compensated, 
according to ICCPR Article 9(4) and (5).[21] The 
Kashmir PSA violates these rights. The PSA allows 
civilians to be arrested for “acting in any manner prej-
udicial to the security of the State.”[22] This contro-
Arbitrary Detention in 
Jammu and Kashmir
by Maya Rose Martin
Early in August 2019, the Indian government stripped 
Jammu and Kashmir of their special status under 
the Indian constitution.[1] Since then, nearly 4,000 
residents of Jammu and Kashmir were arrested and 
detained without trial.[2] These arrests were justified 
by the Public Safety Act (PSA), which allows arrests 
to ensure public order.[3] However, these detentions 
violate the Indian Constitution and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[4] 
India is not fulfilling its obligations to ensure of the 
right to freedom from arbitrary detention and the right 
to a fair trial.
Since the partition of India and Pakistan, the disputed 
status of Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) has led to 
decades of violence in the region.[5] Kashmir has held 
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versial law has been broadly applied by Indian security 
forces; India argues that the law protects citizens from 
militants.[23] In one month, 250 habeas corpus peti-
tions were filed in the region by prisoners challenging 
their detention, a number that would likely increase 
but for the fact that there is a lack of legal representa-
tion for criminal defendants in the region.[24] Howev-
er, this number does demonstrate that a large number 
of detainees have been imprisoned without trial.
If children have been detained in Kashmir, as some 
journalists have suggested, this would violate Article 37 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
[25] Article 37 protects children from arrest and deten-
tion except as a measure of last resort. There are re-
ports of children as young as nine being detained, but 
this has been disputed by the Indian government.[26]
India is also violating its own constitution, as Article 
22 of the Indian Constitution protects against arbitrary 
detention.[27] Article 22 also states that individuals 
are to be informed of the grounds of their arrest in a 
timely manner. However, Article 22(3)(b) does allow 
for arrests and detention on a basis of preservation of 
public order, but those arrests are to be held to a strict 
standard.[28]
Thousands of arrests have been confirmed since Au-
gust 5, 2019, and few of the imprisoned have had a trial 
due to the PSA.[29] The High Court of Jammu and 
Kashmir has ignored or prolonged proceedings for the 
petitions of habeas corpus filed by detainees.[30] These 
actions directly contradict Article 9(3) of the ICCPR, 
intended to give individuals who are unjustly detained 
access to trial.[31] The situation is complicated as most 
attorneys in Kashmir are boycotting the court follow-
ing the arrest of the leaders of the Jammu and Kashmir 
Bar Association in August.[32] The lack of due process 
and access to attorneys is preventing detainees from 
seeking justice.
NGOs, such as Amnesty International, have called on 
India to stop abusing the PSA and release detainees.
[33] At the UN General Assembly in September 2019, 
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan also called on 
the world to sanction India and not allow such human 
rights abuses in Kashmir, making a point to mention 
the targeting of Muslim and non-Hindu Kashmiris.
[34] Few nations besides Pakistan have made diplo-
matic or economic efforts to condemn India.[35] The 
UN Human Rights Council has already condemned 
India’s actions in the Kashmir crisis, with seemingly 
little effect.[36] The most effective result may be from 
India’s courts. Attorneys from other regions of India 
should be allowed to counsel detainees.[37] If petitions 
from Kashmir are allowed to proceed in court, the de-
tentions may be found unconstitutional under Indian 
law.[38]
On October 31, 2019, Kashmir’s constitution was 
nullified, the state was split into two territories (Jam-
mu and Kashmir, Ladakh) and the Indian government 
took more direct control over the region.[39] Increased 
international condemnation over the crisis in Kashmir 
may spur the Indian government to change its actions 
in Jammu and Kashmir. India’s judicial system should 
take action to curb the President and Prime Minister’s 
actions regarding Kashmir. India is violating interna-
tional human rights standards in Kashmir and should 
immediately give detainees access to fair and impartial 
legal counsel and trial.
1 Niha Masih and Joanna Slater, Locked up and shut down: How 




et al.: Student Columns
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law,




2 Yashraj Sharma, Detained in Kashmir, Foreign Policy (Sept. 9, 
2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/09/detained-in-kash-
mir/.
3 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, No. 6 of 1978, INDIA 
CODE (1978), http://indiacode.nic.in.
4 INDIA CONST; United Nations Human Rights, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976.
5 Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/10537286.
6 INDIA CONST.
7 S.C. Res. 47, (Apr. 21, 1948).
8 Abdul Majid and Mahboob Hussain, Kashmir: A Conflict 
between India and Pakistan, 31 S. Asian Studies 149 (2016); 
Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflicts Report, India-Kashmir, 
(Jan. 2019), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/lega-
cy/2014/02/25/India_Kashmir.pdf.
9 Kaushik Deka, How Kashmir Changed on August 5, IN-
DIA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/
india-today-insight/story/how-kashmir-changed-on-au-
gust-5-1577706-2019-08-06.
10 Human Rights Watch, India: Restore Kashmir’s In-
ternet, Phones, (August 28, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2019/08/28/india-restore-kashmirs-internet-phones#.
11 Indian Ministry of Law and Justice, The Jammu and Kashmir 
Reorganisation Act, 2019, THE GAZETTE OF INDIA (Aug. 9, 
2019), http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210407.pdf; K. 
Venkataramanan, Explained: How the status of Jammu and Kash-




12 Peerzada Ashiq, Legislative Council Abolished in J&K, THE 
HINDU (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.thehindu.com/news/
national/jk-administration-orders-abolition-of-legislative-coun-
cil-asks-its-staff-to-report-to-gad/article29723937.ece; India To-
day Web Desk, What is the difference between a state and a union 





13 AFP, About 4,000 people arrested in Kashmir since August 5: 
govt sources to AFP, THE HINDU (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/about-4000-people-arrested-in-
kashmir-since-august-5-govt-sources-to-afp/article29126566.ece.
14 Devjyot Goshal and Alasdair Pal, Thousands detained in 




15 Reporters Without Borders, Media pluralism- collateral victim 
of the crisis in Indian-held Kashmir, (Aug. 16, 2019), https://
rsf.org/en/news/media-pluralism-collateral-victim-crisis-indi-
an-held-kashmir.
16 Akash Bisht, Kashmir lockdown: Stories of torture and arbi-
trary arrests, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2019/09/kashmir-lockdown-stories-torture-arbi-
trary-arrests-190904122016072.html.
17 Devjyot Goshal et al., The transported: Kashmiri prisoners sent 
far from home, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-india-kashmir-detentions-insight/the-transport-
ed-kashmiri-prisoners-sent-far-from-home-idUSKBN1WM2D6.
18 Human Rights Watch, India: Free Kashmiris Arbitrarily De-
tained, (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/16/
india-free-kashmiris-arbitrarily-detained; Kamaljit Kaur Sandhu, 
Farooq Abdullah detained under stringent J&K public safety 
law, INDIA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.
in/india/story/farooq-abdullah-detained-under-public-safe-
ty-act-1599573-2019-09-16.
19 Yogita Limaye et al., The detained children of Kashmir, BBC 
News (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-
india-49772269/the-detained-children-of-kashmir.
20 United Nations Human Rights, supra note 4 art. 9.
21 Id.
22 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, supra note 3.
23 Fayaz Bukhari, India abusing “lawless” detention act in 
Kashmir: rights group, REUTERS (June 12, 2019), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-law/india-abusing-law-
less-detention-act-in-kashmir-rights-group-idUSKCN1TD12T; 
Meenakshi Ganguly, Restrictions, Detentions Persist in Kashmir, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2019/10/07/restrictions-detentions-persist-kashmir; Re-
becca Ratcliffe, Five killed in Kashmir’s deadliest day since losing 
special status, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/17/five-killed-in-kashmirs-
deadliest-day-since-losing-special-status.
24 Staff, Over 250 Habeas Corpus Petitions in J&K High Court 
Since August 5, The Wire (Sept. 20, 2019), https://thewire.in/law/
over-250-habeas-corpus-petitions-in-jk-high-court-since-au-
gust-5; BBC News, Kashmir’s crippled courts leave detainees in 
limbo, (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-in-
dia-49848899.
25 G.A Res. 44/25 art. 37, Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(Nov. 20, 1989).
26 Aneesha Mathur, 9-year-olds among 144 minors detained 
in Kashmir since Article 370 abrogation: Reports, INDIA TO-
DAY (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/
children-among-minors-detained-kashmir-article-370-abroga-
tion-reports-1605322-2019-10-01; Juvenile Justice Committee of 
the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, Report on writ petition 
(Civil) No. 1166/2019 (Sept. 26, 2019).
27 INDIA CONST. art. 22.
28 Kaunain Sheriff M and Mashaarat Masood, Explained: What is 
Jammu and Kashmir’s Public Safety Act?, THEINDIAN EXPRESS 
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/fa-
rooq-abdullah-psa-jammu-and-kashmir-explained-6001031/.
29 Id.
30 Kaunain Sheriff M, Under wraps so far: 252 habeas corpus 
pleas in J&K High Court since August 5, THE INDIAN EX-
PRESS (Sept. 20, 2019), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/
under-wraps-so-far-252-habeas-corpus-pleas-in-jk-hc-since-au-
gust-5-6011628/
31 United Nations Human Rights, supra note 4.
32 BBC News, supra note 24.
33 Amnesty Int’l, India: Detention of Kashmiri politician is ‘bla-




Human Rights Brief, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol23/iss1/1
Xenophobia in South Africa
by Salim Rashid
en/latest/news/2019/09/india-detention-of-kashmiri-politician-is-
blatant-abuse-of-the-law/; Ganguly, supra note 23.
34 Imran Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Speech at 74th Ses-
sion of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 27, 2019).
35 BBC News, Kashmir dispute: Pakistan downgrades ties 
with India, (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-49267912.
36 Kallol Bhattacharjee, UNHRC ask India to end lockdown in 
J&K, THE HINDU (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.thehindu.com/
news/national/un-human-rights-chief-asks-india-pakistan-to-re-
spect-and-protect-rights-of-kashmiris/article29375135.ece.
37 BBC News, supra note 24.
38 Gorky Bakshi, What is Public Safety Act of Jammu & Kashmir: 
All you need to know, JAGRAN JOSH (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.
jagranjosh.com/current-affairs/farooq-abdullah-booked-under-
psa-know-what-is-public-safety-act-1568696075-1.
39 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, India strips Kashmir of special status 
and divides it in two, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/31/india-strips-kashmir-of-
special-status-and-divides-it-in-two; Special Correspondent, New 




In September 2019, looters and protestors targeted 
foreign-owned businesses in Johannesburg, killing and 
displacing several South African residents and immi-
grants.[1] These recent attacks are some of the many 
acts of anti-immigrant violence that have plagued busi-
ness owners for the past few decades.[2] South African 
leaders have attempted to address these issues through 
a series of initiatives following South African indepen-
dence in 1961. For example, the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC), the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the National Con-
sortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA) created the Roll 
Back Xenophobia Campaign (RBX), South Africa’s first 
attempt at recognizing xenophobic rhetoric.[3] Unfor-
tunately, the campaign lost funding in 2002 and never 
realized its goal, with xenophobic violence becoming 
more common in the years following.[4]
South Africa’s improving economy invites unique 
opportunities that are imperative to the success of 
the continent as a whole. South Africa has the second 
largest economy in Africa based on its gross domes-
tic product.[5] Its economy attracts immigrants from 
around the continent who are seeking refuge from 
poverty and persecution in their home countries.[6] 
Many South Africans blame immigrants for hardships 
they face. A Wits University study on forced migration 
found that sixty-four percent of South Africans be-
lieved that immigrants were “generally untrustworthy,” 
and a similar percentage thought that South Africa 
would be better off if immigrants left the country.[7] 
Unemployment in South Africa is between twenty and 
forty percent; however, foreign-born residents are only 
three to five percent of the total population.[8] Over 
time, this rhetoric has evolved into violence. The South 
African Human Rights Commission stated that attacks 
against immigrants in 2008, which claimed fifty-six 
lives, exposed the “vulnerability of [immigrants], par-
ticularly from other African countries.”[9]
Harmful rhetoric starts at the top. Reputable Govern-
ment officials perpetuate negative stereotypes about 
immigrants.[10] Violence against immigrants and neg-
ative stereotypes reinforced by South African leader-
ship are clear violations of South Africa’s international 
human rights obligations. Although President Cyril 
Ramaphosa has condemned South African citizens, 
this ideology is unique among South African leader-
ship.[11] Former President Jacob Zuma stated that the 
South African government cannot ignore that immi-
grants commit the most violent crimes.[12] Gauteng 
Province Police Commissioner Lieutenant, General 
Deliwe De Lange, claimed that “illegal” immigrants are 
responsible for sixty percent of “violence” in his prov-
ince.[13] De Lange prefaced this comment by ensuring 
he is “not xenophobic.” Yet, the African Institute for 
Security Studies found that law enforcement does not 
release data on nationalities of persons they arrest.[14] 
Intentional distortion of facts by trusted government 
representatives fuels distrust towards immigrants and 
justifies the violence that they endure. This rhetoric 
constitutes the government inciting violent acts against 
a race or group of persons of another ethnic origin.
The International Bill of Rights — consisting of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) — is considered 
a hallmark declaration drafted in order to form in-
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society at large. Additionally, Article 4 of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) prohibits govern-
ments from inciting any violent acts against “any race 
or group of persons of another . . . ethnic origin.”[20] 
Lastly, Chapter 2, Article 9 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa states that the government 
may not unfairly discriminate against a number of pro-
tected classes.[21] However, subsection 5 of the same 
Article allows for “fair” discrimination, leaving room 
for injustices against migrants face.
Leaders of other African countries have become un-
settled with South African leadership’s complacency 
in this matter. Following the September 2019 attacks 
in Johannesburg, Nigerian President Muhammadu 
Buhari met with President Ramaphosa to discuss their 
shared concerns about the administration’s commit-
ment to a safe environment for immigrants.[22] Other 
leaders have taken a more abrasive approach. Nigeria’s 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bolaji Akinyemi, 
requested that the Nigerian government to take South 
Africa to the International Criminal Court for alleged 
violations of international treaties. He also claimed 
that the South African government violated Article 2, 
paragraph 2 of the ICESCR for escalating violence be-
tween South African citizens and residents. As Nigeria 
urges the African Union to step in and enforce these 
various international obligations, immigrants look for 
ways to safely flee the country or defend their property.
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In 1948, South Africa was one of four African nations 
that initially abstained from signing the UDHR, partly 
due to the apartheid state.[15] But, on the 70th anni-
versary of the UDHR’s creation, the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa was signed into law by 
former president Nelson Mandela.[16] Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa — 
also known as the “Bill of Rights” — contains similar 
principles found in the UDHR.[17] In fact, the South 
African Parliament considers the UDHR as a predeces-
sor to its own Bill of Rights.[18] The history of apart-
heid in South Africa has shaped the strategies intended 
to protect South African residents from violence and 
discrimination; however, the application of domestic 
and international declarations aimed to protect human 
rights has gone astray.
South African officials have violated Article 2, para-
graph 2 of the ICESCR by threatening the safety of 
people from different “national or social origin” by 
qualifying commonly held and inaccurate accusations.
[19] Comments similar to Police Commissioner De 
Lange’s erroneous claims victimize foreigners without 
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Before Hurricane Maria, a category four hurricane 
that hit Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, Vieques, 
Puerto Rico was already dealing with over fifty years 
of ecological devastation.[1] The hurricane caused 
massive damage, increased poverty levels, and acceler-
ated mass migration, particularly at the Superfund Site 
in Vieques.[2] The government designates the most 
hazardous waste sites as Superfund Sites.[3] The EPA 
labeled the site a Superfund Site because of the U.S. 
Navy’s activities, which hindered Viequenses’ right to 
the enjoyment of a safe and clean environment, a right 
considered at the Thirty-Seventh Session of the Human 
Rights Council.[4] Moreover, Vieques’ complex history 
with the U.S. Navy and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) reflects Puerto Rico’s colonial status and 
lack of self-determination according to the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonization. The EPA represents 
the U.S.’s dedication to the protection of internation-
ally recognized rights, but it has unsuccessfully pro-
tected these rights; yet, Puerto Rico’s territorial status 
impedes the island’s ability to enforce internationally 
recognized environmental law.
From the 1940s until 2003, the United States Navy 
commandeered about three-quarters of Vieques, an 
insular Puerto Rican municipality.[5] During World 
War II, the federal government evicted thousands of 
residents from their homes and placed them in “re-
settlement tracts” in razed sugar cane fields.[6] The 
government then used this land to create a U.S. naval 
base. The naval base used the eastern side of the island, 
called the “Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility,” 
for ground warfare, maneuver training, and live im-
pacts.[7] On the western side of the island, the base 
used an area named the “Naval Ammunition Support 
Detachment (NASD)” as storage for ammunition and 
vehicles. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy blocked 
Vieques, Puerto Rico: U.S. 
Ecological Militarism and 
Climate Change
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the Navy’s secret plan to displace the entire Viequen-
se civilian population, including digging up the dead 
from their graves.[8]
The local resistance movement, opposing the Navy’s 
occupation, expanded after April 19, 1999, when a U.S. 
F-18 fighter jet accidentally dropped two 500-pound 
bombs on an allegedly safe area, killing civilian David 
Sanes Rodriguez.[9] Due to continued protests, the 
U.S. Navy shut down the naval base and withdrew 
from Vieques in 2003, but not without leaving environ-
mental destruction.[10]
Vieques still faces the detrimental consequences of U.S. 
ecological militarism, such as unexploded artillery, and 
monumental pollution released from the heavy metals 
and toxic chemicals caused by the heavy use of muni-
tion dropped on the island.[11] The Navy’s militarism 
has worsened health conditions for locals.[12]
Consequently, and almost ironically, on February 7, 
2005, the EPA placed Vieques on the National Priority 
List, a list of sites throughout the U.S. and its territories 
that contain hazardous substances or pollutants requir-
ing further investigation, at the request of former gov-
ernor, Sila María Calderón.[13] The EPA subsequently 
labeled the “Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training” area in 
Vieques a Superfund Site, recognizing it as a contam-
inated site, pursuant to the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) of 1980.[14] Such action demonstrates that 
the U.S. recognizes its obligation to manage chemicals 
and waste, which have severely impacted Viequenses’ 
human right to a healthy and sustainable environment.
[15] Indeed, throughout the clean-up process, the 
Navy and EPA must ensure community participation 
by meeting with residents and issuing public notices.
[16]
However, the method of clean-up, carried out by the 
U.S. Navy itself, has been problematic for residents. 
The EPA and the Navy have not involved the people of 
Vieques in the Superfund Site decision-making pro-
cess. At one point, the Navy held community meetings 
only in English with highly technical information 
not understandable by the average Viequense person.
[17] Further, the Navy uses an open detonation tech-
nique that eliminates old bombs by blowing them 
up, and open-air burning of vegetation to find cluster 
bombs.[18] These methods subject locals to a cycle of 
ecological militarism and health issues while giving 
Vieques little say in the matter.[19] Vieques’ lack of 
decision-making power contradicts the EPA’s objective 
to rely on community involvement to understand local 
priorities and the goal of providing technical assistance 
to increase community understanding of the clean-
up process.[20] The Navy is trying to fix the damage 
caused by decades-long activity by employing similar 
tactics to what created this precarious situation in the 
first place.
As of 2019, the EPA affirms that hazardous substances 
may still be present at the site, additionally stating that 
clean-up is not complete, human exposure is not under 
control, and the site is not ready for redevelopment due 
to contamination issues.[21] This is especially trouble-
some because Hurricane Maria, as well as Hurricanes 
Harvey and Irma, caused Superfund Sites in Puerto 
Rico to experience inundation, potentially widening 
the toxic footprint of the Vieques Site.[22] Inundation 
spreads toxic chemicals into waterways, communities, 
and farmlands, which is in contrast to the goals of the 
Thirty-Seventh Session of the Human Rights Council.
[23] Contamination has caused heightened cancer 
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rates among Vieques’ residents, and because there are 
still unexploded bombs all over the small island, Judith 
Enck, the former EPA administrator for Region 2, 
stated concern that the bombs on land washed into the 
sea after Hurricane Maria, further spreading contam-
ination.[24] Indeed, if the environmental threat that 
Vieques faced was already perilous due to toxic pollu-
tion, and if Hurricane Maria exacerbated that level of 
peril with inundation, then Vieques warrants particu-
lar attention from the U.S. government. Puerto Rico is, 
after all, a U.S. territory subject to U.S. laws and fiscal 
budget — a fact that the EPA has been accused of over-
looking in other scenarios.[25] These accusations may 
increase given President Trump’s proposed 2020 fiscal 
budget, which would cut funding for the EPA by 31%, 
yet the Navy plans to complete the clean-up on land by 
2026 and the underwater clean-up by 2036.[26]
Although U.S. domestic environmental law serves 
to protect rights that are codified within the interna-
tional human rights framework, the EPA has failed to 
properly protect the environmental and health rights 
of the people of Vieques. Yet, because of Puerto Rico’s 
status as an unincorporated territory, Puerto Rico has 
not been able to directly enforce U.S. environmental 
law. The inadequate response to the crisis in Vieques 
demonstrates how the federal government has violated 
Puerto Rico’s inalienable right to self-determination 
and independence because the United States abstained 
from voting in the UN General Assembly resolution 
1514 (XV).[27] According to the UN Special Commit-
tee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation 
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples (“UN Special Com-
mittee on Decolonization”), despite the majority of 
Puerto Rican people rejecting its current status as a 
U.S. territory on November 6, 2012, the United States 
has failed to set in motion a decolonization process for 
Puerto Rico.[28]
The United States’ political control of Puerto Rico 
denies the island sovereign decision-making power to 
address the crisis caused by the U.S. Navy’s training 
site and Hurricane Maria in Vieques. The United States 
and the political representatives of Puerto Rico must 
begin a decolonization process immediately, which is 
not only long overdue but necessary for the Viequenses 
to adequately combat the effects of the environmental 
damage and ensure the protection of their fundamen-
tal human right to a clean and healthy environment.
[29] Unless the United States relinquishes its grip on 
Puerto Rico and places it on the path to decolonization 
and independence, it will be difficult for Puerto Rico to 
properly confront its challenges given that the federal 
government has not enforced the Navy’s cooperation 
and neglected the leadership of Viequense people in 
the operation.
1 Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening With the Relief Effort in 
Puerto Rico?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.the-
atlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/what-happened-in-puerto-
rico-a-timeline-of-hurricanemaria/541956/.
2 Dec. of the Special Committee of 19 June 2017 Concerning 
Puerto Rico, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2018/L.7 (June 12, 2018); 
“What is Superfund?” EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/
what-superfund.
3 Zoë Schlanger, Climate Change Threatens 945 US Toxic Waste 
Sites With Flood and Fire, QUARTZ (Nov. 20, 2019), https://
qz.com/1752777/how-climate-change-threatens-the-majority-of-
us-toxic-waste-sites/.
4 H.R.C. Res. 28/11, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/59 (Jan. 24, 2018).
5 Vieques Superfund Cleanup Map, ESRI, https://www.arcgis.
com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=c525c1733d
ac4c249e46a6610f6b2c6c.
6 Lawrence Wittner, Breaking the Grip of Militarism: The Story 
of Vieques, COUNTERPUNCH (May 2, 2019), https://www.
counterpunch.org/2019/05/02/breaking-the-grip-of-militarism-
the-story-of-vieques/.
7 Vieques Superfund Cleanup Map, supra note 5.
8 Lawrence Wittner, supra note 6.
9 Sarah Emerson, The Puerto Rican Island the US Military De-





11 Lawrence Wittner, supra note 6.
12 Id.
13 Vieques Superfund Cleanup Map, supra note 5.
14 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 




15 H.R.C. Res., supra note 4.




17 Sarah Emerson, supra note 9.
18 Dena Takruri, Puerto Rico’s Vieques Still Reels from De-




19 Lawrence Wittner, supra note 6.





et al.: Student Columns
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law,
21 Id.
22 Evaluation of Remedy Resilience at Superfund NPL and SAA 
Sites, EPA (Aug. 15, 2018).
23 Phil McKenna, Climate Change Threatens 60% of Toxic Super-
fund Sites, GAO Finds, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/19112019/
superfund-flooded-climate-change-toxic-health-risksea-
level-rise-wildfires-gao-report-epa.
24 Valeria Pelet, Puerto Rico’s Invisible Health Crisis, THE AT-
LANTIC (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/09/vieques-invisible-health-crisis/498428/; Uma-
ir Irfan, Puerto Rico is Slipping into an Environmental Crisis, 
VOX (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenviron-
ment/2017/10/26/16523868/toxic-waste-hurricane-maria-epa-su-
perfund-puerto-rico.
25 Emily Atkin, Puerto Rico is Already an Environmental Trage-
dy. Hurricane Maria Will Make It Even Worse, THE
NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 19, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/arti-
cle/144888/puerto-rico-already-environmentaltragedy-
hurricane-maria-will-make-even-worse.
26 Kelley Czajka, Trump’s 2020 Budget Would Slash Funding for 
EPA Programs, PACIFIC STANDARD (Mar. 11, 2019), https://
psmag.com/news/trumps-2020-budget-would-slash-funding-for-
epa-programs; Vieques Superfund Cleanup Map, supra note 5.
27 G.A. Res. 1541(XV).
28 Dec. of the Special Committee of 19 June 2017 Concerning 
Puerto Rico, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2018/L.7 (June 12, 2018).
29 H.R.C. Res. 37, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/L.19 (Mar. 16, 2018).
fore, parents are sometimes reluctant to register their 
children as having a disability — around three percent 
of children in Kazakhstan are registered as having a 
disability, as opposed to the global average of ten to fif-
teen percent.[4] Children who are registered as having 
a disability are excluded from society and kept locked 
away in institutions.[5] The State does not provide 
these children with a proper education, and they often 
remain in institutions for the rest of their lives, as the 
state moves them to an adult institution when they 
turn eighteen.[6] Children living with disabilities
who are not in institutions are often homeschooled or 
put in inadequate, segregated schools.[7] These schools 
do not facilitate any socializing with other children, 
increasing the marginalization of children living with 
disabilities. Further, the teachers working to teach the 
children rarely show up, stunting their progress and 
preventing them from progressing in their education 
and knowledge.
Furthermore, the conditions of the state facilities are 
prison-like.[8] Children are sedated —sometimes for 
up to twenty-four hours.[9] They are beaten, forced to 
work, and made responsible for the younger children.
[10] Children are crammed into rooms — up to twenty 
children may share a room, and those who are unable 
to walk are kept in beds or cribs.[11] The children 
living in these institutions are unable to participate in 
society or go to school, and are rarely given an edu-
cation within the institution.[12] They are subject to 
physical restraints and forced sedation.[13]
In 2019, Human Rights Watch conducted in-depth 
interviews with children living in state-controlled 
institutions and published a report detailing the issues 
the children were facing.[14] They recommended that 
children should be integrated into society and that 
institutionalization should be ended in Kazakhstan to 
the furthest extent possible — by encouraging children 
with disabilities to be taken care of by their families 
and communities.[15] Children should be support-
ed by their communities rather than forced to live in 
neglect.[16]
Kazakhstan is a party to both the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and it has 
federal law focused on disabilities — Law No. 39/2005.
[17] The general international standard for a state’s 
responsibilities for people living with disabilities is 
Kazakhstan: Neglects and 
Abuses Against Children 
with Disabilities
by Courtney Veneri
Kazakhstan has nineteen state-controlled institutions 
for children with mental illnesses or developmental 
disabilities.[1] The children in these institutions are 
marginalized and live apart from society in poor con-
ditions, where they are subjected to neglect and abuse.
[2] Kazakhstan must improve conditions for children 
living with disabilities in state-controlled institutions 
in order to properly implement its own legislation and 
to comply with its international obligations.
People living with disabilities in Kazakhstan are gener-
ally not considered to be valuable members of society, 
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set forth in the CRPD. Article 7 requires that all the 
provisions set forth in the CRPD be applied to children 
as well.[18] States are required to ensure that people 
living with disabilities are able to participate in their 
communities and are protected from inhumane or de-
grading treatment.[19] Article 23 of the CRC provides 
the international basis for the rights of children with 
disabilities.[20] Article 23 requires states to provide 
the means for children with disabilities to live a full 
life, such as education, social services, and adequate 
medical care.[21] Further, Article 23 specifically states 
that these practices are all intended to allow children 
“active participation in the community.”[22] Kazakh-
stan has its own law to implement the rights of people 
living with disabilities.[23] Article 4 requires people 
living with disabilities to be integrated into society, and 
Article 5 prevents discrimination or violation of their 
human rights.[24]
Kazakhstan’s treatment of children who have disabil-
ities falls short of both international law and their 
own legislation. Keeping children isolated from their 
communities directly violates the CRPD and the CRC.
[25] Article 20 of the CRC requires that any child sep-
arated from the family environment be given special 
protection — keeping the children isolated in beds and 
preventing them from getting an education is directly 
contrary to that provision.[26] Children living with 
disabilities should be able to interact and participate in 
their communities and access education as laid out in 
these international covenants.
Further, the way children are treated in the state-run 
institutions is also not consistent with both the CRPD 
and the CRC.[27] Children who live in institutions 
must be treated with respect — abusing children or 
sedating them for days on end is illegal under both 
Conventions. This sort of abuse, such as being beaten 
and restrained for hours at a time, conflicts with Arti-
cle 15 of the Convention for Persons with Disabilities 
and Article 19 of the CRC.[28] The state must treat 
these children with respect and provide opportunities 
within these institutions, such as access to education.
[29] The children are entitled to the same opportuni-
ties as children living outside of institutions.[30]
Finally, Kazakhstan needs to comply with its own 
internal law. Kazakhstan provides its own legal frame-
work for ensuring compliance with its international 
obligations, but it has failed to enforce the law on a 
consistent basis.[31] There needs to be an overhaul 
of the state-run institutions for children living with 
disabilities and social education to reduce the levels of 
societal discrimination those children are exposed to. 
For example, Kazakhstan could more strictly enforce 
rules against the abuse of children by institutional staff 
and begin public information campaigns to push for a 
better public understanding of people living with dis-
abilities, along with creating opportunities both in in-
stitutions and outside of them to provide an education 
to children with disabilities. By showing that abuse will 
not be tolerated while also creating more community 
awareness and education, children living with disabili-
ties will have more opportunities to live full lives.
Kazakhstan is not compliant with its international 
legal obligations, nor its internal national law. It must 
provide better facilities for children living with dis-
abilities in institutions, and it must start providing 
opportunities for these children to be included in their 
communities so they may benefit from education and 
proper care.
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